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 Executive Summary 
 
In September 2002, a new market in “Economic Derivatives” was launched allowing 
traders to take positions on future values of several macroeconomic data releases. We provide an 
initial analysis of the prices of these options. We find that market-based measures of 
expectations are similar to survey-based forecasts although the market-based measures somewhat 
more accurately predict financial market responses to surprises in data. These markets also 
provide implied probabilities of the full range of specific outcomes, allowing us to measure 
uncertainty, assess its driving forces, and compare this measure of uncertainty with the 
dispersion of point-estimates among individual forecasters (a measure of disagreement). We also 
assess the accuracy of market-generated probability density forecasts. A consistent theme is that 
few of the behavioral anomalies present in surveys of professional forecasts survive in 
equilibrium, and that these markets are remarkably well calibrated. Finally we assess the role of 
risk, finding little evidence that risk-aversion drives a wedge between market prices and 
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  In 1993 Robert Shiller forcefully argued for the creation of a new set of securities tied 
to the future path of the macroeconomy.  He argued that existing equity markets represent 
future claims on only a small fraction of future income, and that active “macro markets” would 
allow for more effective risk allocation, allowing individuals to insure themselves against 
many macroeconomic risks. 
  In October 2002, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank set up the first markets tied 
directly to macroeconomic outcomes; they call these products “Economic Derivatives.”  These 
new markets allow investors to purchase options whose payoff depends on growth in non-farm 
payrolls, retail sales, levels of the Institute for Supply Management’s manufacturing diffusion 
index, initial unemployment claims and the Euro-area harmonized CPI.  New U.S.-based 
markets have recently been created for GDP and the international trade balance, and plans are 
underway for securities on U.S. CPI.
1 
In this market “digital” or “binary” options are traded, allowing traders to take a 
position on whether economic data will fall in specified ranges, thereby providing market-
based measures of investors’ beliefs about the likelihoods of different outcomes.  That is, the 
option prices can be used to construct a risk-neutral probability density function for each data 
release.  Until the introduction of these Economic Derivatives such information was 
unavailable and probabilistic or density forecasts still remain quite rare. 
  We now have data for the first 2½ years of this market, and use these to provide an 
initial analysis.  Given that we have only 153 data releases, many of our results will be 
suggestive.  To preview our findings, in section 3 we find that central tendencies of market-
based forecasts are very similar to, but more accurate than surveys.  Further, financial market 
                                                 
1 Beyond these markets, the Chicago Board of Trade is offering federal funds rate futures and options and the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange has a thinly traded CPI futures contract.  Online markets such as Hedgestreet and 
Tradesports also offer an array of economic derivatives to retail investors. 2 
 
responses to data releases are also better captured by surprises measured with respect to 
market-based expectations than survey-based expectations, again suggesting that they better 
capture investor expectations.  Some behavioral anomalies evident in survey-based 
expectations – such as forecastable forecast errors – are notably absent from market-based 
forecasts. 
The Economic Derivatives market prices options on many different outcomes, allowing 
us to assess forecasts of a full probability distribution.  In section 4 we compare the dispersion 
of the option- and survey-based distributions, and exploit the unique feature of our data that 
allows us to address the distinction between disagreement and uncertainty.  Distributions of 
survey responses are measures of disagreement, or heterogeneity of beliefs, across respondents.  
Measuring uncertainty requires knowing how much probability agents attribute to outcomes 
away from the mean expectation and economic derivatives prices at different strikes provide 
exactly that information.  Although there appears to be some correlation between disagreement 
and uncertainty, we find that on a release-by-release basis disagreement is not a good proxy for 
uncertainty.  The time series of market-based measures of uncertainty also provides some 
evidence in favor of the view that (at least market participants believe that) non-farm payrolls 
and retail sales follow GARCH-like processes.  In section 5 we move beyond the first and 
second moments of the distribution, analyzing the efficacy of these option prices as density 
forecasts. 
While most of our analysis proceeds as if market-prices correspond one-for-one with 
probabilities, in section 6 we ask whether it is reasonable to expect risk aversion to drive a 
wedge between prices and probabilities.  We find that the risk premium is in most cases 
sufficiently small that it can be ignored for many applications.  Finally, we investigate the 
extent to which pricing of Economic Derivatives can provide an informative estimate of the 
degree of risk aversion of investors. 
We view part of our contribution as simply introducing these fascinating data to the 
research community and thus in the next section we provide some institutional background on 





2. The Market for Economic Derivatives 
 
The institutional features of these new macro markets are worthy of some comment.   
Economic derivatives are securities with payoffs based on macroeconomic data releases.   
Nonfarm payrolls options, for example, settle when the employment report is released and the 
payrolls number is known.   
The standard instruments traded are a series of digital (binary) options.  The digital call 
(put) options pay $1 if the release is above (below) the strike.  Typically around 10-20 different 
options are traded, each at different strike prices.  Both puts and calls are traded for each data 
release.  For transparency we will focus on the price of a “digital range” – a contract paying $1 
if the announced economic number lies between two adjacent strike prices.  Other types of 
options, such as digital puts and calls, capped vanilla options and forwards, are also traded in 
these markets.  Each of these can be expressed as portfolios of digital ranges and are priced as 
such.  
Figure  1 shows the prices of digital ranges from the May 12, 2005 auction (more on 
auctions below) which traded on what the monthly percentage change in retail sales (excluding 
autos) in April 2005 would be.  The data was released later in the same day.  Assuming risk-
neutrality (which we will assume and defend in section 6), this histogram corresponds to the 
forecast probability distribution of the possible outcomes of this release.  The mean of the 
distribution, the market’s expectation, was 0.72 percent, compared to the mean survey forecast 
of 0.5 percent.  In the event, the released value came in at 1.07 percent, closer to the market-
implied expectation.  Assuming that probability is distributed uniformly within each bin, these 
market prices suggest that investors attributed about a 22 percent probability to the release 
coming in as high or higher.  The major novelty of the economic derivatives market is that it 
allows the calculation of this implied probability.  
While most financial markets operate as a continuous double auction, the market for 
economic derivatives is run as a series of occasional auctions, reflecting an attempt to 
maximize liquidity.
2  The auction mechanism is also noteworthy as it is a pari-mutuel system.  
That is, for a given strike price all “bets” (puts and calls) that the specified outcome either will 
                                                 
2 Currently every order must go through Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, or ICAP (an interdealer broker).  As of 
the writing of this paper an agreement was in place to involve the CME in the auction process.  4 
 
or will not occur are pooled; this pool is then distributed to the winners in proportion to the size 
of their bet (the number of options purchased).
 3  As such, the equilibrium price of these binary 
options is not known at the time the orders are made; indeed, it is only known when the last 
trade has occurred.  Throughout the auction period (usually an hour) indicative price estimates 
are posted, reflecting what the price would be were no more orders to be made.   
 
Figure 1 



























































Auction on Retail Trade Release for April 2005; Held May 12, 2005
An Example: Price of Digital Options
 
 
The use of pari-mutuel systems is unusual in financial markets, but common in horse race 
betting.  Eisenberg and Gale (1959) provide useful results on the existence and uniqueness of 
equilibrium in such settings.  The one important difference from horse race betting is that in 
                                                 
3 The transaction cost—the fee paid to Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank—is one percent of the notional amount 
(one cent per digital option) capped at ten percent of the price of the option.  5 
 
the Economic Derivatives market it is possible to enter limit orders.  This yields the possibility 
of multiple equilibria, which is resolved by an auction-clearing algorithm that chooses the 
equilibrium price vector that maximizes total trades.
 4  As in traditional Dutch auctions, all 
trades (at a given strike) that take place are executed at the same price, regardless of the limit 
price. 
This pari-mutuel mechanism is useful because it expands the number of ways to match 
buyers with sellers.  While traders can be matched if one buyer’s demand for calls matches 
another trader’s demand for puts, the system does not require this.  The horse track betting 
analogy is useful: even if nobody “sells” a given horse, as long as people bet on different 
horses the betting market clears.  Similarly, buying a given digital range can be thought of as 
shorting all other outcomes and therefore having investors bidding at different strikes allows 
the pari-mutuel algorithm to clear the market and generate much greater volume. 
In the economic derivatives market, option payoffs are determined with reference to a 
particular data release.  Thus the payoff is based on, for example, the initial BLS estimate of 
growth in non-farm payrolls, rather than the best estimate of the statistical agencies (which will 
be subject to revision for years to come).  In this sense these options provide hedges against 
event risk, where the events are data releases. 
The events/auctions that are covered in the empirical analysis of this paper are growth of 
non-farm payrolls, the Institute for Supply Management manufacturing diffusion index (a 
measure of business confidence), change in retail sales ex-autos, and initial jobless claims.  
Options on GDP and trade balance releases commenced subsequent to our data collection 
efforts.  Options on the Eurozone Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices also exist, but 
unfortunately we lack the high frequency financial market data for European securities 
required to analyze these data.  Of the four markets that we do analyze, the non-farm payrolls 
market is the most liquid; business confidence and retail sales markets have liquidity 
comparable to each other but are less liquid.  Initial claims options are the least liquid, however 
because this is a weekly release we have the largest number of observations in this market.
5 
                                                 
4 The auction clearing pari-mutuel algorithm, called “Parimutuel Derivative Call Auction technology” is patented 
by Longitude Inc., who also license their product to create markets in mortgage prepayment speeds and natural 
gas and crude oil inventories (see Baron and Lange, 2003, for more on this algorithm).   
5 Auctions of initial claims options are not held for the releases that immediately precede the employment report.  
Our data set consists of 33 non-farm payrolls auctions, 30 business confidence auctions, 26 retail trade auctions, 
and 64 initial claims auctions.  6 
 
Typically these auctions have taken place in the morning of the data release and they were 
sometimes preceded by another auction on the same release one or two days prior (non-farm 
payrolls auctions are held on both the morning the data are released and one day before).
6,7  
Thus economic derivatives provide hedging opportunities against only very high frequency 
movements—event risk—and really cannot be said to provide the sorts of business cycle 
frequency risk-sharing opportunities envisioned by Shiller.  We return to a more careful 
assessment of the role of risk in these markets in section 6.  But first we focus on the uses of 
market prices as forecasts. 
 
3.  The Accuracy of Market-based Forecasts 
 
We begin by comparing forecasts generated by the Economic Derivatives market with an 
alternative information aggregator, the “survey forecast” released by Money Market Services 
(MMS) on the Friday before a data release.
8  Specifically, we compare the mean forecast from 
each mechanism, although our results are insensitive to the choice of mean versus median 
forecasts.  For the MMS forecast, the “consensus” forecast typically averages across around 
30  forecasters.  For the market-based forecast, we aggregate across the distribution of 
outcomes and calculate the distribution’s mean assuming that the probability distribution is 
uniform within each bin (boundaries of bins are defined by adjacent strikes).
9  As such, we 
implicitly assume that the price of a digital option is equal to the average belief that the 
specified outcome occurs.  Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005) discuss the relationship between 
prediction market prices and beliefs.  We return to this issue in later sections, showing that 
ignoring risk aversion does very little violence to the data.   
                                                 
6 Some auctions on European inflation take place two months prior to the data release.   
7 When more than one auction was held for a single data release, we analyze data from the latest auction.   
8 MMS was acquired by Informa in 2003 and no longer exists; Action Economics is now providing the same 
survey service.   We use the MMS numbers for most of our sample and the Action Economics survey for the more 
recent period.  Bloomberg survey numbers were used to fill some gaps.  Despite using more than one source, we 
call our survey numbers “the MMS survey” as most of our data is from this source.  The MMS survey sample 
consists mainly of professional economists working in financial markets, and many of the firms surveyed are 
probably also participants in the economic derivatives market. 
9 More specifically, throughout the paper we treat the distribution as discrete, assuming that all probability mass 
occurs at the midpoint of the relevant bin.  For the tails we impute an upper- and lower-bound so that the midpoint 
would be equal to the mean of that bin if the pdf were normal.  Our results are invariant to different treatments of 
tail probabilities.  7 
 
Figure  2 shows the relative forecasting performance of the survey- and market-based 
forecasts.  Visual inspection suggests that the market-based forecast mildly dominates the 
survey forecast, a fact verified formally in Table 1. 
 
Figure 2 
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Table 1 examines two specific measures of forecast accuracy, the mean absolute error and 
the root mean squared error, contrasting the performance of the Economic Derivatives market 
and the survey respondents.  Each column reports these summary statistics for a different data 
series.  In order to provide some comparability of magnitudes across columns we normalize the 
scale of each by dividing our measures of forecast errors by the historical standard deviation of 8 
 
survey forecast errors over an earlier period.
10  Thus, the units in the table can be read as 
measures of forecast errors relative to an historical norm.  This scaling makes the magnitudes 
sufficiently comparable that we can pool our observations across data series in the final 
column. 
                                                 
10 In order to maintain a non-overlapping sample, we calculated the standard deviation of the survey-based 
forecast errors for samples ending in October 2002.  The “historical” sample begins in January 1990 for  nonfarm 
payrolls and retail sales, in July 1991for ISM, and in July 1997 for initial claims .  The historical standard errors 
of these forecasts are 115,600 non-farm payroll jobs, 18,500 initial unemployment claims, 0.37% growth in retail 
sales and 1.99 points of the ISM index. 9 
 
Table 1: 


































































































Panel D: Horse Race Regression (Fair-Shiller) 



































0.46 0.93  0.40  .20  .99 
Sample size 
(Oct. 2002–Jul. 2005) 
33 30  26  64  153 
Notes:  Forecast errors normalized by historical standard error of survey-based forecasts. 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
***,
 ** and 
* denote statistically significant regression coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  Comparing the two rows of Panel A shows that the market-based forecasts errors were 
on average smaller than the survey forecasts for all four data series.  To interpret the 
magnitudes, start by noting that in all cases the estimates are less than one, implying that both 
sets of forecasts were more accurate than the survey forecast had been over the pre-2002 
period.  Beyond this, the improvements in forecast accuracy are meaningful, if not huge.  For 
instance, pooling all of the data shows that relying on market-based forecasts rather than 10 
 
survey forecasts would have reduced the size of forecast errors by 0.04, which by virtue of the 
scaling is equivalent to 5½% of the average forecast error over the preceding decade.  While 
meaningful, this reduction is not statistically significant.  Panel B shows that analyzing the root 
mean squared error yields roughly similar results.  In Panel C we compare the correlation of 
each forecast with actual outcomes.  (Naturally these correlations can also be interpreted as the 
coefficient from a regression of standardized values of the outcome on standardized values of 
the forecast.)  Each of these coefficients is statistically significant, suggesting that each 
forecast has substantial unconditional forecasting power.  Even so, the market-based forecast is 
more highly correlated with outcomes than the consensus forecast for all four data series. 
  Panel D turns to a regression-based test of the information content of each forecast 
following Fair and Shiller (1990).  Naturally there is substantial collinearity, as the market- and 
consensus-based forecasts are quite similar.  Even so, we find rather compelling results.  A 
coefficient of unity for the market-based forecast cannot be rejected for any of the indicators.  
By contrast, conditioning on the market-based forecast renders the survey forecast 
uninformative, and in three of four cases the survey-based forecast is not statistically different 
from zero and in the one case in which it is significant, it has a perverse negative coefficient.  
In the final column we pool the forecasts to obtain more precise estimates and again the 
market-based forecast dominates, and this difference is both statistically and economically 
significant. 
  These findings are probably partly due to the fact that the economic derivatives auction 
occurs on the morning of the data release, while the survey takes place up to a week before.  
Thus, option prices incorporate more information than was available to survey respondents.  In 
an attempt to partly ameliorate this information advantage, we also re-ran our regressions in 
Panel D, controlling for two indicators of recent economic news: the change in equity prices 
and bond yields between the market close on the night prior to the release of the survey data to 
the night before the economic derivatives auction.  These indicators for the release of relevant 
news were typically insignificant, and our main conclusions were not much altered by this 
control. 
It seems likely that the improved performance is due to the market effectively 
weighting a greater number of opinions, or more effective information aggregation as market 
participants are likely more careful when putting their money where their mouth is. 11 
 
  We next ask which forecast aggregator better predicts the financial market reactions to 
the release of economic statistics.  Or alternatively phrased, we ask: which forecast best 
embeds the forecasts of the equity and bond markets?  In Figures 3a and 3b we show the short-
term change in the S&P 500 and the 10-year Treasury note yield that result from the release of 
economic news.  The solid dots measure the innovation as the deviation of the announced 
economic statistic from the economic derivatives forecast, while the hollow squares represent 
the innovation as the deviation from the consensus forecast. 
 
Figure 3a 
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Economic News: Deviation of Announcement from Forecast
Graphs by Economic data series
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Economic News: Deviation of Announcement from Forecast
Graphs by Economic data series
Bond Market Responses to Economic Statistics
 
 
Table  2 formalizes the comparisons in Figures  3a and  3b.  Specifically, we run 
regressions of the form: 
 
( ) ( )
Economic Derivs Survey
tt t t t ∆Financial variable=α+β* Actual -Forecast * Actual -Forecast γ +  
 
  We measure changes in stock and Treasury markets around a tight window, comparing 
financial market quotes 5 minutes prior the data release to 25 minutes after the event.
11  We 
                                                 
11 The intraday data we use help us isolate the market reaction to the data release in question with minimum noise.  
The yields we use are yields of on-the-run Treasury securities.  The stock price changes are from S&P futures 
contracts as the stock market is not open at 8.30 a.m. (EST), when the three of the four macroeconomic data series 
we are interested in are released (ISM is a 10.00 a.m. release).  In taking the market snapshots, if there is no trade 
in a given security 5 minutes before the event, we search back in time until we find a trade or a settlement price.  
If there is no trade exactly 25 minutes after the event we again search back in time, until the data release moment. 13 
 
analyze changes in implied Treasury yields, rather than changes in their prices, and report these 
changes in basis points; the stock market response is reported as percentage change.  As 
before, we rescale our forecast error variables so that the estimates can be interpreted as the 
effect of a one-standard deviation forecast error. 
Several patterns emerge in these data.  First, comparing columns suggests that the non-
farm payrolls release has the largest effect on financial markets; retail trade and business 
confidence are also important, but the weekly initial claims data rarely moves markets by 
much.  Comparing panels shows that the yields on longer-dated securities more reliably and 
more forcefully respond to the release of these economic statistics than do yields on short-term 
Treasury bills.  It is likely that short-term interest rate expectations have been strongly 
anchored by Federal Reserve statements recently, reducing the sensitivity of short-term yields 
to data release surprises.  The stock market also responds quite vigorously to non-farm 
payrolls.
12  Lastly, comparing rows within each panel, financial markets appear to respond to 
economic data to the extent that they differ from the Economic Derivatives forecast; 
conditioning on this, the survey forecast has no statistically significant explanatory power in 
any individual regression.   
To maximize our ability to test the joint significance across columns, we pool our data 




t s s s,t s,t s s,t s,t
s Economic series
∆Financial variable= * Actual -Forecast * Actual -Forecast αβ γ
∈
++ ∑
   
The final column of Table 2 reports the joint statistical significance of the β’s and the 
γ’s, respectively.  These joint tests clearly show that financial markets respond to the 
innovation as measured relative to the Economic Derivatives forecast and conditional on this, 
appear not to respond to the deviation of the data from the survey forecast. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
If there are no trades in this 25 minute interval we mark a zero change, assuming that if there was a surprise in the 
data release that changed the shadow price of a security there would have been a trade over this time period.  We 
do not search for a trade forward in time so as to ensure that the price change we observe is not due to another 
event that took place later in the same day.  The data set is described in detail in Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson 
(2005).  
12 Note that while a strong data release for an important statistic should unambiguously push yields up, the effect 
on stock prices is not as clear.  The news that the state of the business cycle is better than expected will lift the 
S&P index, but the associated increase in interest rates has a dampening effect on equities.   14 
 
Table 2:  
















( ) ( )
Economic Derivs Survey
tt t t t ∆Financial variable=α+β* Actual -Forecast * Actual -Forecast γ +  
Panel A: 3 Month Treasury Bill 























Panel B: 6 Month Treasury Bill 






















Panel C: 2 Year Treasury Note 























Panel D: 5 Year Treasury Note 

























Panel E: 10 Year Treasury Note 
























Panel F: S&P 500 

























Notes:  Dependent variables normalized by historical standard error of survey-based forecasts. 
(Standard errors in parentheses)  
***,
 ** and 
* denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
For sample size, see Table 1. 
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In sum, Tables 1 and 2 establish that the Economic Derivatives forecast dominates the 
survey forecast (although survey forecasts perform quite well) both in predicting outcomes and 
in predicting market responses to economic news.  Many previous papers have demonstrated 
that professional forecasters exhibit a range of predictable pathologies.  For instance, Mankiw, 
Reis, and Wolfers (2003) analyze data on inflation expectations from the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters and the Livingstone Survey, finding that the median forecast yielded 
errors that were predictable based on recent economic developments, past forecast errors, or 
even the forecast itself.  Were similar results to persist in the Economic Derivatives market, 
these predictable forecast errors would yield profitable trading opportunities. 
In Table 3 we repeat many of the tests in that earlier literature, asking whether forecast 
errors are predictable based on a long-run bias (Panel A), on information in the forecast itself 
(Panel B), on previous forecast errors (Panel C), or on recent economic news (Panel D).  We 
test the efficiency of the survey forecast and the Economic Derivatives forecasts separately, 
thus each cell in the table represents a separate regression.  As before, we rescale the forecast 
errors by the historical standard deviation of the survey forecast errors for each indicator. 
Each regression in Table 3 asks whether forecast errors are predictable; each panel tests 
different sets of predictors, and each column performs the test for a different economic 
indicator.  The final column provides a joint F-test that the forecast errors are not predictable, 
aggregating across all four economic indicators in each row.  In each succeeding panel we ask 
whether each forecast yields predictable on the basis of a simple constant term (Panel A), 
information in the forecast itself (Panel B), based on the forecast error from the previous month 
(Panel C), or based on recent economic information (Panel D).
13  Only Panel C seems to show 
the only real evidence of behavioral biases, with the survey-based forecast yielding 
significantly negatively autocorrelated forecast errors, particularly for retail sales.  Equally we 
should not overstate this result: while we cannot reject a null that market-based forecasts are 
efficient, we also cannot reject a null that they show the same pattern of predictable forecast 
errors as the survey-based forecasts. 
 
                                                 
13 Panel D controls for the slope of the yield curve (measured as the difference between the 10 year and 3-month 
yields), and the change in the S&P 500 over the preceding 10 trading days as regressors.   16 
 
Table 3:  
















Panel A: Bias 
Forecast errort =α 























Panel B: Internal efficiency 
Forecast errort = α + β*Forecastt  
[Square brackets shows test α=β=0] 































Panel C: Autocorrelation 
Forecast errort = α + ρ*Forecast errort-1 























Panel D: Information efficiency 
Forecast errort = α + β*Slope of yield curvet-1 + γ*∆S&P 500t-1,t-10 
[Square brackets shows test β=γ=0] 














































Panel E: Joint Test of all Predictors (p-value of joint significance) 
Forecast errort = α + β1*Survey Forecastt + β2*Market Forecastt + β3*Forecast errort-1 
+ β4*Slope of yield curvet-1 + β5*∆S&P 500t-1,t-10 
Economic Derivatives  p=.900 p=.129  p=.228  p=.015  p=.0664 
Survey  p=.625 p=.036  p=.017  p=.004  p=.0003 
Notes:   Each cell represents a separate regression. 17 
 
Dependent variables normalized by historical standard deviation of survey-based forecasts. 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
***,
 ** and 
* denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
Finally in Panel E we combine each of the above tests, testing whether forecast errors 
are predictable based on the full set of possible predictors (including both the market- and 
survey-based forecasts themselves).  On this score the superior performance of the market-
based forecasts is much more evident.  The survey-based forecasts yield predictable forecast 
errors for three of the four statistical series; not surprisingly, the survey does best on non-farm 
payrolls, which is the most closely watched of these numbers.  The market-based forecasts 
show no such anomalies except in the case of initial claims, which is easily the least liquid of 
these markets.   Overall these results confirm the results in the earlier behavioral literature 
documenting anomalies in survey-based forecasts.  Equally, they suggest that such 
inefficiencies are either absent, or harder to find in market-based forecasts. 
This section compared the mean forecast from surveys and economic derivatives, with 
the basic finding that while surveys do well (despite some behavioral anomalies), markets do 
somewhat better in forecasting.  If one is only interested in forecasting the mean, using surveys 
might suffice; however, Economic Derivatives provide a lot more information than just the 
mean forecast.  Observing that the mean of the market-based probability distribution “works” 
the way it should is comforting and holds promise for the information content of the higher 
moments of the distribution, the subject of the next section.   
 
4.  Disagreement and Uncertainty 
 
We now turn to analyzing the standard deviation of the state-price distribution.  We will 
refer to this standard deviation as “uncertainty”, reflecting the fact that this is the implied 
standard error of the mean forecast.  Table 4 compares the market’s average assessment of 
uncertainty with the realized root-mean-squared error of both the market- and survey-based 
forecasts over the same period.  These results suggest that the market-based measure of 
uncertainty is reasonably well calibrated.  We also include a third comparison: estimates by the 
official statistical agencies of the standard error of their measurements of these economic 
statistics, where available.  Market expectations of the RMSE of forecast errors are only 18 
 
slightly larger than sampling error in the case of non-farm payrolls, and slightly smaller in the 
case of retail sales.  
Table 4:  
Expectations and Realizations of Forecast Accuracy 
RMSE of Forecasts 

































  SD of Survey Forecast Errors  103.7 1.55  0.46  15.5 
Sampling error 










Notes: For estimates of the standard errors of the official estimates, see Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004, p.115). 
 
Explicit measures of uncertainty are rare in macroeconomics, so we compare this market-
based measure with the standard deviation of point forecasts across forecasters, and following 
Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003), we refer to the latter as “disagreement”.  The (previous) 
absence of useful data on uncertainty had led many researchers to analyze data on 
disagreement as a proxy for uncertainty.  To date there has been very little research validating 
this approach, and indeed the only other measure of uncertainty we are aware of (from the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters) shows only weak co-movement with measures of 
disagreement (Llambros and Zarnowitz, 1987.)  
Figure  4 shows results consistent with Llambros and Zarnowitz: disagreement and 
uncertainty co-move, but the correlation is not strong.  The obvious difference in the levels is 
due to the fact that central expectations of respondents are close to each other even when each 
respondent is uncertain of their estimate. 
In Table 5 we analyze these relationships a little more formally, regressing uncertainty 
against disagreement.  Panel A shows that there is a statistically significant positive correlation 
between disagreement and uncertainty for all series except ISM.  The final column shows the 
joint significance of the coefficients on disagreement, suggesting that the contemporaneous 
relationship is quite strong.  Indeed, Chris Carroll has suggested that one can interpret these 
regressions as the first stage of a split-sample IV strategy, allowing researchers to employ 19 
 
disagreement as a proxy for uncertainty in another dataset.  This, of course, depends on how 
high an R
2 one views as sufficient in the first stage regression.  
Figure 4 
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Panel  B of this table carries out a similar exercise focusing on lower-frequency 
variation.  In this case, disagreement and uncertainty are still correlated but this correlation is 
substantially weaker.  The 5-period moving average of disagreement is a significant explanator 
of the 5-period moving average of uncertainty only for retail sales and initial claims.  (Even 
this is overstates the strength of the relationship, as we do not correct the standard errors for the 
autocorrelation generated by smoothing.)  Jointly testing the significance across all four 
indicators we find that the relationship between low frequency variation in disagreement and 
uncertainty is not statistically significant, and the R
2’s of these regressions are again 20 
 
sufficiently low and varied as to caution that disagreement might be a poor proxy for 
uncertainty in empirical applications.  
Table 5 
















Panel A: Contemporaneous Relationship 























2  0.11 -0.03  0.20  0.17   
Panel B: Low Frequency – 5 period centered moving averages 
Smoothed Uncertaintyt = α + β*Smoothed Disagreementt 





















2  0.01 -0.002  0.23  0.32   
Notes:  (Standard errors in parentheses) 
***,
 ** and 
* denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
Having demonstrated fairly substantial time series variation in uncertainty (albeit over a 
short period) naturally raises the question: What drives movements in uncertainty? 
In Panel A of Table 6 we look to see whether any of the variation is explained by 
movements in expected volatility of equity markets.  That is, our regressors include the closing 
price of CBOE’s VIX index on the day prior to the economic derivatives auction, as well as the 
closing price one and two months prior (for the initial claims, these lags refer to one and two 
weeks earlier).  As in tables 1-3, we rescale the uncertainty measure by the standard deviation 
of historical forecast errors to allow some comparability across columns.  Panel A shows that 
for all four indicators the contemporaneous values of the implied volatility index is 
uncorrelated with uncertainty about forthcoming economic data.  While a couple of specific 
lags are statistically significant, they suggest a somewhat perverse negative correlation 
between uncertainty and expected volatility in the stock market.  This lack of correlation likely 
suggests that uncertainty is usually not about the fundamental state of the economy but about 21 
 













Panel A: Uncertainty and Expected Volatility 
Uncertaintyt = α + β1*VIXt + β2*VIXt-1 + β3*VIXt-2 



























Joint sig?  p=0.02  p=0.31 p=0.73 p=0.80 
Adjusted R
2  0.21 0.02  -0.07  -0.03 
Panel B: Persistence 





























Joint sig?  p=0.02  p=0.45 p=0.14 p=0.10 
Adjusted R
2  0.24 -0.01  0.12  0.06 
Panel C: Pseudo-GARCH Model 






























































Joint sig?  p=0.05  p=0.41 p=0.21 p=0.11 
Adjusted R
2  0.38 -0.009  0.21  0.11 
n [Panel A, B/C]  [33,30] [30,27]  [26,23]  [64,61] 
Notes: (Standard errors in parentheses) 
***,
 ** and 
* denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 23 
 
VIXt refers to the close of CBOE’s VIX index on the day prior to the auction.  VIXt-1 refers to the day prior to the 
previous data release.  Uncertaintyt-1 refers to the standard deviation of the state price distribution for the previous 
data release in that series.  All of the uncertainty measures are rescaled by the historical standard deviation of 
forecast errors for that series. 
 
Panel B also examines the persistence of uncertainty, and uncertainty about non-farm 
payrolls and retail sales appears to show some degree of persistence.  Finally Panel C jointly 
tests whether uncertainty is a product of both past uncertainty and past realizations, as posited 
in GARCH models.  Market assessments of the uncertainty in non-farm payrolls, retail sales, 
and initial claims appears to be well-described by these variables, although we find no such 
evidence for ISM.
14  Finally we ask whether these market-based measures of uncertainty 
actually predict the extent of forecast errors. 
Figure  5 seems to suggest that uncertainty is not strongly related to larger (absolute) 
forecast errors (note that these forecast errors are standardized by their historical standard 
errors).  We perform a more formal test in Table 7.  If the uncertainty measure is appropriately 
calibrated, we should expect to see a coefficient of one in the regression of absolute forecast 
errors on uncertainty. 
Overall Table 7 suggests that these tests have very little power.  In no individual case is 
the absolute forecast error significantly correlated with the market-based measure of 
uncertainty.  The final column pools the data, again finding no evidence of a significant 
correlation.  That is, the data cannot reject the null that there is no information in the time 
series variation in market-based uncertainty that helps predict time series variation in forecast 
errors.  On the other hand, the estimates are imprecise enough that, as the second row shows, 




                                                 
14 While Table 6 provides useful descriptive detail, it is silent on the issue of driving forces.  There are potentially 
three important influences that may be driving variation in uncertainty about a particular economic statistic: 
fundamental uncertainty about the true underlying state of the economy, data-driven uncertainty whereby other 
data series have not spoken clearly about the state of the economy, and uncertainty about the extent of possible 
measurement error in the underlying economic statistic.  Financial market responses to economic news can 
potentially help sort out which driving forces are important as economic news has its largest impact on beliefs 
(and hence on financial markets) when there is greater uncertainty about the true state of the economy.  By 
contrast, traders will be more likely to discount the same sized shock if their uncertainty reflects concerns about 
measurement.  Our statistical tests for these produced very imprecise estimates that we do not report, but we note 
this potential use of economic derivates based information. 24 
 
Figure 5. 

















.8 .9 1 1.1 .4 .6 .8 1
.4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
Business Confidence (ISM) Initial Unemployment Claims
























Uncertainty (SD of the Market-based State Price Distribution)
Data scaled by historical standard error of survey-based forecasts
Uncertainty and Forecast Errors
 
Table 7  








Initial Claims  Joint 
Signif. 
(F-test) 
Absolute Forecast Errort = α + β*Uncertaintyt 











p=0.32 p=0.25  p=0.16  p=0.69  p=0.26 
Test: β=1 
(Efficient forecast) 
p=0.02 p=0.81  p=0.84  p=0.37  p=0.09 
Notes:  (Standard errors in parentheses) 
***,
 ** and 
* denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  Forecast errors normalized by historical standard error of survey-based forecasts. 
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Of course the object of interest in these regressions—the standard deviation of the state 
price distribution—is a summary statistic from a much richer set of digital options or density 
forecasts, and so we will obtain greater power in the next section as we turn to analyzing these 
density forecasts more directly. 
 
5.  Full Distribution Implications 
 
A particularly interesting feature of the Economic Derivatives market is that it yields not 
only a point estimate, but also a full probability distribution across the range of plausible 
outcomes.  Exploiting this, we can expand our tests beyond section 3, which asked whether the 
mean forecast is efficient, to also ask whether the prices of these options yield efficient 
forecasts of the likelihood of an economic statistic falling in a given range. 
Figure  6 provides an initial analysis, pooling data from all 2,235 digital call options 
(contracts that pay $1 if the announced economic statistic is above the strike price) across our 
153 auctions.  We grouped these options according to their prices, and for each group we show 
the proportion of the time that the economic statistic actually is above the strike price.  These 
data yield a fairly close connection, and in no case do we see an economically or statistically 
significant divergence between prices and probabilities. 
  While the evidence in Figure  6 suggests that the Economic Derivatives prices are 
unbiased, it does not speak to the efficiency of these estimates, an issue we now turn to.  
Because density estimates are hard to come by, the forecast evaluation literature has focused 
on evaluating point forecasts rather than densities.  An intermediate step between point and 
density estimate evaluation is interval forecast evaluation.  An interval forecast is a confidence 
interval such as “nonfarm payrolls will be between 100,000 and 180,000 with 95 percent 
probability.”  Christoffersen (1997) shows that a correctly conditionally calibrated interval 
forecast will provide a hit sequence (a sequence of correct and incorrect predictions) that is 
independently and identically Bernoulli distributed with the desired coverage probability.  A 
density forecast can be thought of as a collection of interval forecasts, and Diebold, Gunther, 
and Tay (1998) show that the i.i.d. Bernoulli property of individual interval forecasts translates 
into the i.i.d. uniform(0,1) distribution of the probability integral transform, zt, defined as 
 26 
 
() ( 0 , 1 )
t iid y
t z x dx ~   Uniform π
−∞ =∫  
 
where π(x) denotes the price of an option paying $1 if the realized economic statistic takes on 
the value x, and yt is the actual realized value of economic statistic.  Thus zt can be thought of 
as the “realized quantile,” and the implication that this should be uniformly distributed 
essentially formalizes the argument that if the prediction density is correct, the ‘x’ percent 
probability event should be happening ‘x’ percent of the time.  In the data we do not observe 
exact state-prices π(x), but rather digital ranges, ()
b
a x dx π ∫ ; to estimate the realized quantile we 
simply assume that π(x) is uniformly distributed within each strike-price range. 
Figure 6 
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In Figure 7 we calculate the realized quantile for each auction, pool the estimates across 
different economic statistics and plot the relevant histogram.  A simple way to test for 27 
 
deviations from uniformity derives from inverting the earlier logic: if the distribution is 
uniform, then the probability that any given realization is in any given bin should follow a 
Bernoulli distribution with the hit probability equal to the width of the bin, and hence the 
number of realizations in each bin should follow a binomial distribution.  Thus in Figure 7 we 
show the relevant 95% critical values under the assumption of i.i.d. uniformity. 
Figure 7 
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  Figure 7 shows that the distribution is generally close to uniform, albeit with a peak 
around 0.5, which is suggestive of excess realizations close to the median forecast.  That said, 
this distribution is statistically indistinguishable from a uniform distribution.
15 
                                                 
15 Note that the critical values are appropriate for each bin separately, but they are inappropriate for jointly testing 
that the heights of all bins are drawn from a binomial distribution. 28 
 
The inference in this figure is partly shaped by the specific bin widths chosen for the 
histogram.  Figure 8 shows an alternative representation, mapping both the entire cumulative 
distribution function of the probability integral transform and the uniform distribution.  The 
figure also shows the deviations from uniformity that would be required for a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test to reject a null that the realized quantiles are drawn from a uniform distribution.  
As seen, this suggests that the data are fairly close to an idealized uniform(0,1) distribution, 
and that these data yield no statistically significant evidence falsifying this null. 
Figure 8   
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Delving deeper, Figure 9 plots the same transformed variable for each data series 
separately. 29 
 
Figure 9   
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Graphs by Economic data series




Disaggregating the realized quantile by data series confirms that there is little evidence 
of non-uniformity of these distributions although there are some interesting hints of small 
miscalibrations in density forecasts. In particular, the ISM CDF is too steep in the central 
section, suggesting that too few realizations fall in the tails of the forecast distribution.  The 
non-farm payrolls probability integral transform series is also very close to the upper critical 
value, suggesting too many realizations in the left tail.  Neither of these leads to a rejection of 
the uniform distribution null hypothesis, however. 
Figures 8 and 9 show that the economic derivatives based density forecasts have correct 
coverage.  Efficient density forecasts also require independence of the probability integral 
transform variables over time.  We therefore now turn to examining the time series of the 
probability integral transforms in Figure 10. 30 
 
Figure 10   
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Graphs by Economic data series
Time Series: Realized Quantiles
 
  
The time series plots do not suggest any clear time series correlation.  To be sure, we 
have run simple AR(3) models, and found no statistically significant evidence of 
autocorrelation. 
Finally we turn to a test that allows us to test jointly for both serial independence and 
uniformity of the realized quantile, maximizing our statistical power.  Berkowitz (2001) notes 
that there exist more powerful tests for deviations from normality than from uniformity, 
particularly in small samples.  He suggests analyzing a normally-distributed transformation of 
the probability integral transform.  Specifically, he advocates analyzing: 
( )
11 () ( )
t y
tt nz x d x π
−−
−∞ =Φ =Φ ∫  31 
 
where Φ
-1(zt) is the inverse of the standard normal distribution function.  Thus, if zt is iid 
~U(0,1), then this implies that nt is iid ~N(0,1).  We can thus test this null against a first-order 
autoregressive alternative allowing the mean and variance to differ from (0,1) by estimating: 
1 () tt t nn µ ρµ ε − − =− +  
We estimate this regression by maximum likelihood.  Berkowitz shows the exact log-
likelihood function for the univariate case; it is simple to adapt this to the case of an 
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⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑∑
where the first term aggregates over observations where the lagged dependent variable is not 
observed, and the second term aggregates over all others. 
Table 8 reports our estimation results.  Estimating 3 parameters across each of 4 data 
series we find only two coefficients that are individually statistically distinguishable from the 
efficiency null.  For each series we perform a likelihood ratio test that jointly tests whether the 
estimated models significantly deviate from the efficiency null.  For none of our series is there 
significant evidence that the realized quantiles violate the iid uniform requirement.  Finally, in 
order to maximize our statistical power we pool the estimates across all four indicators, and 
once again the test suggests that these density forecasts are efficient. 
The evidence presented in this section shows that economic derivatives option prices 
are accurate and efficient predictors of the densities of underlying events.  This finding is 
surprising in the sense that asset prices usually embed a risk premium due to risk aversion and 
for this reason tend to be systematically biased—a bias that does not seem to be present in this 
market.  The implications of risk and risk aversion in the pricing of economic derivatives are 
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data 
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2 ˆ ˆˆ (, ,) LL µ σρ   -18.20 -12.59  -11.45  -51.45 -100.42 
(0,1,0) LL   -21.34 -13.65  -12.82  -54.19 -101.99 










Sample size  33 30  26  64 153 
Notes:  (Standard errors in parentheses) 
***,
 ** and 
* denote statistically significant deviations from the null at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Forecast errors normalized by historical standard error of survey-based forecasts. 
 
6. The Role of Risk 
 
  Thus far we have interpreted the prices of digital options as density forecasts – an 
approach that would be warranted if investors were risk-neutral.  Yet options and option 
markets exist precisely because there is risk, and it seems plausible that agents willingly pay a 
risk premium for the hedge offered by macroeconomic derivatives.  We now turn to assessing 
the magnitude of this risk premium.  To preview, we find that for an investor who holds the 
S&P 500 portfolio the aggregate risks that are hedged in these markets are sufficiently small 
that for standard assumptions about risk aversion the premium should be close to zero.   
Further, we show that option prices are typically quite close to the empirical distribution of 
outcomes.  We then explore the corollary of these results, investigating what the pricing of 
these options implies about risk aversion. 
Using option prices to make inference about risk and risk aversion is not a new idea, 
but is seldom attempted in the literature due to the complications arising from properties of 
standard options—complications that are not present in the economic derivatives market.  In 33 
 
important papers, Jackwerth (2000) and Aït-Sahalia and Lo (2000) analyzed options on the 
S&P 500 to derive measures of risk aversion.  Using economic derivatives to measure 
perceived risk and risk attitudes is far easier for several reasons.  First of all, the options in 
these markets provide direct readings of state-prices; these do not have to be constructed from 
portfolios of vanilla options.  More importantly, since the options expire within the same day 
of the auction, time discounting is not an issue and the discount factor can be set to zero.  
Similarly none of the concerns arising from the presence of dividends are present here.   
To illustrate the relationship between risk aversion and the pricing of economic 
derivatives, we start by considering a representative investor who is subject to some risk that 
with probability p will change her wealth to β percent of its current value, w.  The investor can 
buy or sell economic derivatives to protect herself against this shock.  We consider the 
purchase of a derivative that pays $1 per option purchased if the event occurs.  Thus, the 
investor chooses how many derivatives to purchase (x) at a price π to maximize her expected 
utility: 
 
( ) ( )
{x} Max EU(w) pU w (1 )x (1 p)U w x β ππ =+ − + − − . 
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That is, the investor purchases options until the marginal rate of substituting an 
additional dollar between each state is equated with the ratio of the marginal cost of 
transferring a dollar between states. 
Because these economic derivatives are in zero net supply, in a representative agent 
model equilibrium requires that x












This expression yields some very simple intuitions.  If β is unity then the probability and the 
state price are the same regardless of the degree of risk aversion.  Indeed, such an option would 34 
 
be redundant because there is no risk to be hedged.  Alternatively if agents are risk-neutral 
(U’(w)=U’(βw)), then again the option price represents the probability that the event will 
occur.  If investors are risk averse and the option pays off following a negative shock to wealth 
(β<1) then the state price is higher than the true probability.. If the option pays off following a 
positive wealth shock (β>1) then the risk-averse investors will price it at a value lower than its 
probability.  Alternatively phrased, risk aversion leads the state-price distribution to shift to the 
left of the probability distribution, and this shift is larger the smaller the ratio U’(w)/U’(βw); 
that is, distribution shifts further left for more risk-averse investors, and for larger adverse 
shocks. 
Extending this logic to the case where the investor is subject to many possible shocks, 
and where there are markets available for her to hedge each risk is somewhat cumbersome, but 
yields only a minor modification.  Specifically, the investor may face a variety of shocks where 
each specific shock, indexed by i, changes wealth to βi percent of baseline and occurs with 
probability pi.  Investors hedge these risks so as to maximize expected utility by purchasing xi 
options at price πi, and each such option pays $1 if the specified shock occurs.  We refer to πi 
as a state-price, and the distribution as the state-price distribution.  The representative 
consumer’s problem is: 
 
i
ii i j j {x }
ij
Max E[U(w)] pU( w x x ) βπ =+ − ∑ ∑  
 
We combine the first-order condition with the pari-mutuel mechanism constraint that 
total premiums paid should cover total payoffs in all states of the world ( : ij j
j
ix x π ∀= ∑ ), to 















In Figure 11 we use this equilibrium relationship to assess the relationship between 
state prices and probabilities at different levels of risk aversion.  Specifically, to make this 
exercise relevant to assessing the pricing of economic derivatives,  we solve for the entire 
state-price distribution when the investor risks being hit by wealth shocks that are drawn from 35 
 
a normal distribution.  In this example a one-standard deviation negative shock causes wealth 
to decline by 1% (That is, β=1+0.01z where z~N(0,1)).  We calculate option prices for the log-
utility case (γ=1), a substantially more risk averse case (γ=5) at the upper end of values usually 
assumed to be plausible by macroeconomists, and for a level of risk aversion typically thought 
implausible, but required to generate the observed equity premium (γ=20).  
Figure 11  
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As can be seen fairly clearly, for standard levels of risk aversion, the price distribution 
closely resembles the risk-neutral distribution.  Increasing risk-aversion shifts the distribution 
to the left and the higher the risk aversion the more the state-price and data generating 
distributions are different. 36 
 
More generally, our option pricing formula allows us to utilize data on any two objects 
out of the utility function, the distribution of shocks and the state prices, to make inferences 
about the risk premium.  In order to assess the likely magnitude of the risk premium, we begin 
by analyzing the divergence between the state-price distribution and the shock distribution that 
would be implied by specific utility functions and the economic shocks we see in our data.  
This requires us first to map the relationship between economic shocks and changes in wealth, 
then to map the empirical distribution of such economic shocks, before plugging these data 
into the above equation to back out the risk premium suggested by the theory.  
Our analysis in section 3 (and specifically Figure 2) shows that the economic statistics 
have important effects on equity and bond markets.  Backing out the implications of these 
shocks for wealth requires us to be more precise about a specific model of the economy.  We 
assume complete markets, which implies the existence of a representative investor 
(Constantinides, 1982).  Following Jackwerth (2000) and Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000) we 
assume that movements in the S&P 500 are representative of shocks to the entire stock of 
wealth.  While one might be concerned that news about the economy affects different sectors 
differently, these are diversifiable risks, and so with complete markets should not affect wealth.  
Thus to recover the shock to wealth that macroeconomic derivatives allow one to hedge, we 




tt t ∆S&P 500=α+β* Actual -Forecast  
 
As before, we examine changes in the 30 minute window around the announcement, 




Table 9  
























2  0.31 0.005  -0.03  -0.006 
n  33 30  26  64 
Notes:  Forecast errors normalized by historical standard error of survey-based forecasts. 
   (Standard errors in parentheses) 
***,
 ** and 
* denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  As expected, we find that positive shocks to non-farm payrolls, business confidence 
and retail trade are positive shocks to wealth, while higher initial claims is a negative shock.  
Comparing columns, it is clear that the non-farm payrolls surprise is easily the most important 
shock.  The coefficient is also directly interpretable: a one standard deviation shock to non-
farm payrolls raises wealth by 0.37% and the 95% confidence interval extends from +0.17% to 
+0.54%.  These magnitudes are all much smaller than those used to construct Figure  11, 
suggesting that the relationship between prices and probabilities is even closer than that figure 
suggested.  More to the point, these coefficient estimates correspond to β-1 in the simple model 
presented above, allowing us to calculate the risk premium directly. 
  Rather than make specific parametric assumptions, we simply observe the distribution 
of different sized economic shocks in our data, and use a kernel density smoother to recover 
the shock distribution, using the estimates in Table  9 to rescale forecast errors into the 
corresponding wealth shocks.  In this framework the frequency of specific shocks, their effects 
on wealth, and assumptions about risk aversion are sufficient to yield an estimate of the 
expected risk premium embedded in any particular strike price.  Consequently in Figure 12 we 
show the state price distribution that the theory implies, based on the empirical shock 
distribution and assumptions about risk aversion.  The risk-premium is simply the difference 
between the state price distribution, and the risk-neutral or empirical shock distribution.  
Clearly for most plausible utility functions the risk premium is extremely small.   
Indeed, for log utility the risk premium is less than one percent of the price even for very 
extreme outcomes.  Even with rates of constant relative risk aversion as high as five, the risk 38 
 
premium is still essentially ignorable; the only real exception to this is the non-farm payrolls 
release, which constitutes a much larger shock to wealth.  In that instance, the price of an 
option with a strike price two standard deviations from the mean may be inflated by around 
4 percent (and hence a call option would be priced at $0.026 instead of $0.025).  If the relevant 
relative risk aversion parameter is as high as 20, then the data suggest that option prices might 
be somewhat more biased. 
Figure 12   
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Effects of Risk on the State Price Distribution
 
  
Of course, for many applications, the mean forecast implicit in the state price 
distribution is the object of interest.  Thus in Table 10 we compute the difference between the 
mean of the state price distribution and the mean of the underlying probability distribution for 
different values of assumed risk aversion.  Again these numbers are based on the empirical 39 
 
distribution of shocks, although assuming normally distributed shocks yields similar 
magnitudes.  Our aim is simply to provide a rule-of-thumb adjustment for calculating the mean 
of the probability distribution from the widely reported mean of the auction price distribution. 
Panel A shows that, under risk aversion, the mean of the state price distribution will 
under-estimate the mean of the risk-neutral (“true”) distribution for the three pro-cyclical 
series, but will lead to a minor overstatement of initial claims, which is countercyclical.  The 
adjustments in Panel A are in the same underlying units as the statistics are reported in, and 
hence suggests, for instance, that if the relative risk aversion of investors is five, then the mean 
of the state price distribution understates the mean forecast by about 1600 jobs.  Panel  B 
presents these same results in a metric that better shows that these magnitudes are small, 
scaling the risk-premium adjustment by the standard error of the forecast.  In each case the bias 
from simply assuming risk-neutrality is less than one-tenth of a standard error, and in most 
cases, it is orders of magnitude smaller. 
 
Table 10 




ISM Retail  Sales 
(ex autos) 
Initial Claims 
Panel A: Risk Premium: 
Mean of Probability Distribution Less Mean of State-Price Distribution 
 
Risk-Neutral (γ=0)  0 0  0  0 
Log Utility (γ=1)  -0.32 -0.001  -0.0002  0.002 
Risk-Averse (γ=5)  -1.60 -0.005  -0.0009  0.008 
Extremely Risk Averse (γ=20)  -6.40 -0.021  -0.0034  0.033 
Panel B: Risk Premium 
Measured Relative to Historical Standard Deviation of Forecast Error 
Risk-Neutral (γ=0)  0 0  0  0 
Log Utility (γ=1)  -0.0028 -0.0005  -0.0005  0.0001 
Risk-Averse (γ=5)  -0.0137 -0.0028  -0.0023  0.0004 
Extremely Risk Averse (γ=20)  -0.0553 -0.0107  -0.0094  0.0018 
Notes: In panel A, the units are thousands of non-farm payroll jobs, points on the ISM index, percentage growth 




  While Table 10 suggests that risk should lead the market-based forecast to be only 
slightly lower than the risk-neutral forecast, we can take advantage of the time series 
movement in uncertainty to test this.
16  In Figure 13 we show forecast errors and uncertainty 
for each data series.  In no case is the regression line statistically significant, suggesting that 
the data do not falsify the implications in Table 10 that the slope should be approximately zero.  
Notice that this exercise is slightly different from the one in Table 10 as here we look at the 
consequences of time-variance in the amount of risk, while in Table 10 the amount of risk is 
implicitly taken as invariant but the price of risk changes.  
 
Figure 13 
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16 We thank Jeffrey Frankel for suggesting this test to us. 41 
 
  In sum, Figure 12 and Table 10 imply that under standard assumptions about risk, the 
state price distribution is a reasonable approximation to the true underlying probability 
distribution, and this conclusion holds even when we make fairly extreme assumptions about 
risk aversion.  Indeed, Figure 13 and our analysis of the probability integral transform in the 
previous section confirmed precisely this point and in most cases market prices provided quite 
successful estimates of empirical realizations. 
Figure 14 makes this point in an alternative manner, pooling the data across all auctions 
within each data series to map both the empirical shock distribution and the average state price 
distribution.  The two appear remarkably close given the limited number of observations 
identifying the distribution of outcomes. 
 
Figure 14:  
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  Our option-pricing formula also suggests that we can compare option prices and 
observed outcomes to back out an estimate of risk aversion.  Indeed, under the assumption of 




aa s , a s , a
as
L log( ) log( ) log( )
γ πγ β π β
− ⎡⎤
=+ − ⎢⎥
⎣⎦ ∑∑  
where auctions are indexed by a and digital options within each auction are further indexed by 
s, the asterisk indexes the winning digital option, and thus π
* and πs,a come from the data, while 
estimates of the wealth impacts of shocks, βi are taken from Table 8, and β
* is the relative 
wealth position given the observed shock. 
We pooled all of our data to estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ), but 
these data do not yield much power: the 95% confidence interval around our estimate of γ 
extends from -182 to +27, with a central estimate that suggests risk-loving behavior.  This is 
readily apparent in Figure 13, which shows that the state price distribution is to the right of the 
outcome distribution for non-farm payrolls, and to the left of the outcome distribution for the 
counter-cyclical initial claims data.  (As Figure 12 shows, risk aversion would suggest the 
opposite pattern.) 
However, rather than highlight our point estimate, we regard its enormous imprecision 
as arguably more interesting.
17  This imprecision derives from the fact that under our complete 
market assumptions the economic risks that can be hedged in this market are sufficiently small 
that alternative views about risk aversion do not affect all that much how one would price 
options tied to these risks.  From an estimation standpoint this implies small amounts of noise 
in the option prices potentially yield very different implications for point estimates of implied 
risk aversion.  Again, Figure 12 is instructive: essentially our estimates suggest that the data 
cannot distinguish between any of the state price distributions drawn on that figure, and given 
how close they are, this is not particularly surprising. 
Thus while this market does not yield particularly useful estimates of risk aversion, the 
flipside is that this is driven by the fact that option prices are relatively insensitive to 
assumptions about risk aversion.  From a practical perspective this is good news:  the option 
                                                 
17 Note that when estimating implied risk aversion in this fashion, we treated the βi as known.  The confidence 
interval would have been even wider had we accounted for the variance imparted by having the β’s estimated.   43 
 





  In this paper we provided a first analysis of the option prices from the new economic 
derivatives market.  Economic derivatives (which have an interesting, pari-mutuel, market 
clearing mechanism) are novel because these binary options are written on economic data 
releases and state-prices of different strikes provide information not only about markets’ 
central belief but also about implied probabilities of outcomes away from the mean.  This 
information is not available from surveys. 
  We dwelled on several aspects of the economic derivatives, starting with their 
predictive performance.  These options appear to yield efficient density forecasts, a rarity.  
Knowing that event probabilities are correctly priced in this market makes inference using the 
dispersion statistics convincing.  In particular, this justifies using the option-based standard 
deviation to measure uncertainty about a data release.  Comparing uncertainty with 
disagreement, the standard deviation of survey responses, showed that these two measures of 
dispersion do not have a high degree of correlation.  It may not be advisable to use 
disagreement as a proxy for uncertainty.  
  The density forecast efficiency tests, when applied to market-based measures, are joint 
tests of efficient pricing and absence of risk premia.  Our finding that economic derivatives 
based densities are efficient therefore indicate that risk premia in this market is unlikely to be 
sizable.  We exploited the institutional structure of economic derivatives to study risk and risk 
aversion.  This is quite straightforward when options from this market are used, compared to 
using S&P 500 options, which require taking into account time discounting and dividends.  We 
believe economic derivatives are promising instruments for economists who would like to use 
asset prices to learn about agents’ beliefs and preferences.   
   We should emphasize that we view this paper as an initial exploration.  We showed that 
economic derivatives correctly capture subjective beliefs and provided some applications of 
this information.  Having these subjective probabilities will facilitate future research to study 44 
 
how expectations are formed and how they relate to actions, as well as to analyze agents’ 
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